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A NEW LEGAL ORDER, OR A NON-EXISTENT ONE?
SOME (EARLY) EXPERIENCES IN THE APPLICATION 
OF EU LAW IN CENTRAL EUROPE
Michal Bobek*
Summary: One of the mantras of European Community Law is that 
which defi nes it as “[…] a new legal order of international law […]”. 1 
Like every mantra, this one has become a quasi-compulsory quote at 
the opening of every other treatise on EC law. If we take the Van Gend 
statement as our starting point, how is the “new legal order” doing in 
the new Member States, some two years after accession?
This paper consists of three parts. The fi rst part discusses current “Eu-
ropean” case law in national courts, giving examples of the use of EC 
law before domestic courts. Special attention is paid to cases which 
“made it to Luxembourg”, i.e. references for preliminary rulings from the 
new Community courts. The second part of the paper focuses on three 
particular areas that are currently of great importance to the smooth 
application of EC law in the new Member States: issues concerning the 
temporal application of EC law and inter-temporal arrangement; the 
problem of the lack of due publication of EC law provisions in the lan-
guages of the new Member States; and the question of who is supposed 
to be acquainted with, and raise points about, Community law before a 
court. The third part of the paper makes some generalisations about the 
current and future application of EC law in Central Europe. 
The focus of this paper is limited: our area of territorial analysis will 
be the “Visegrad states”, i.e. the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, 
Poland and Hungary.2 Of these four, the greatest attention will be 
paid to the current situation in the Czech Republic.
I. EC law in national courts - cases
Current case law, most of which is still pending, is extremely diverse. 
It can hardly be put into any neat scientifi c boxes. For the sake of acces-
sibility, let us divide it into three categories:
* Law clerk (référendaire) to the Chief Justice, Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech 
Republic, Brno. I owe my thanks to Jan Komárek, Mark Gillis and Zdeněk Kühn for their 
valuable comments and suggestions. This article refl ects the law as it stood in March 2006. 
Contact: michal.bobek@st-edmund-hall.oxon.org 
1 Case 26/62 NV. Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend & Loos v. Neth-
erlands Inland Revenue Administration [1962] ECR 1, at page 5.
2 The Visegrad Group, comprising these four states, is named after a castle and town in 
Hungary where the group was formed on 15 February 1991. 
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(i) cases in which EC law points were raised and the case was sent for 
preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice; 
(ii) cases in which EC law was, or most likely will be, directly applied, 
where the EC law angle is decisive for the dispute;
(iii) cases in which EC law was, or is likely to be, discussed as a subsidi-
ary argument. 
I.1. Preliminary rulings - the “long-awaited party” phenomenon
At the time of writing of this article (March 2006), there were nine 
requests for preliminary ruling from the Visegrad states (which, as it hap-
pens, account for the totality of such requests from all the new Member 
States.3 Six of these were still pending before the Court, while three had 
already been decided. Five of the nine requests came from Hungary,4 one 
from Poland,5 and three from the Czech Republic.6
The fi rst two cases, which were already submitted in the summer 
of 2004, both came from Hungary. The Court of Justice decided them in 
October 2005 and January 2006, respectively. Case C-328/04, Attila Va-
jnai, demonstrates that asking the fi rst question is not all that important. 
What matters more is to ask a meaningful one. 
Attila Vajnai concerned the criminal conviction of Mr Vajnai, vice-
president of the Hungarian Worker’s Party. In February 2003 Mr Vajnai 
took part in a demonstration in Budapest. In the course of the demon-
stration, he pinned a red star about 5 centimetres in size to his clothing, 
and drew the attention of the crowd and the press to it. Due to this he 
was prosecuted and found guilty of the minor offence of using a totalitar-
3 There would seem to be another reference for preliminary ruling from the Supreme Ad-
ministrative Court of Lithuania, made by a judgment of that court of 20 December 2005 in 
case A15-1292-2005, concerning the excise duty on alcoholic beverages. This case has not 
yet been assigned a case number in the Court of Justice’s registry, and there has been no 
notice in the Offi cial Journal. 
4 Case C-302/04 Ynos kft v János Varga [2006] ECR I-00371; case C-328/04 Criminal pro-
ceedings against Attila Vajnai,[2005] ECR I-08577; case C-261/05 Lakél Kft.,Pár-Bau Kft., 
and Rottelma Kft. v Komárom-Esztergom Megvei Közigazgatási Hivatal [2005] OJ C 205/13; 
case C-290/05 Ákos Nádasdi v Vám-és Pénzügyörség Észak-Alföldi Regionális Parancsnok-
sága [2005] OJ C 296/10; case C-333/05 Ilona Németh v Vám-és Pénzügyörség Dél-Alföldi 
Regionális Parancsnoksága [2005] OJ C 315/8.
5 Case C-313/05, Maciej Brzeziński v Dyrektor Izby Celnej w Warszawie [2005] OJ C 
281/5.
6 Case C-437/05 Jan Vorel v »eský Krumlov Hospital and case C-64/06, »eský Telecom, 
a.s. v. Czech On Line, a.s. (notice not yet published in the OJ). A third request for preli-
minary ruling originating from Czech courts has not yet been assigned a case number in 
the Court of Justice’s registry; it concerns the enforceability of customs regulations which 
were not duly published, and was made by an order of the Regional Court in Ostrava of 10 
February 2006, case 22 Ca 69/2005-43 Skoma-Lux, s.r.o. v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc. It is 
discussed below in section II.2.
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ian symbol in public, which is prohibited by Art. 269/B, paragraph 1(b) 
of the Hungarian Criminal Code. Under that provision, a person who 
makes public use of the swastika, the SS insignia, the “arrow cross”, the 
hammer and sickle, the fi ve-pointed red star, or any other sign repre-
senting one of these symbols has committed a minor offence punishable 
by a fi ne - provided that such conduct does not lead to a more serious 
criminal offence. 
The Budapest Metropolitan Court (Fövárosi Bíróság), considering 
this case on appeal, decided to stay the proceedings and ask the Court 
of Justice whether the Hungarian ban on symbols of totalitarianism was 
compatible with Art. 6 of the Treaty on the European Union and Com-
munity law principles of non-discrimination, freedom of expression and 
political conviction. The argument put forward by the Metropolitan Court 
was rather obscure: the court indicated that in Italy, for instance, mem-
bers of left-wing parties are allowed to use such symbols as the red star 
or the hammer and sickle. Prohibiting the same conduct in Hungary con-
stitutes discrimination and disregards principles common to all Member 
States. 
By an order dated 6 October 2005, the Court of Justice rejected the 
request as manifestly inadmissible. In paragraphs 13 and 14 of the order, 
the Court held that it has no competence to reply to questions outside the 
framework of Community law, with no connection whatsoever to any of 
the Treaty’s provisions.7
The second request for preliminary ruling from the new Member 
States, decided by the Court of Justice on 10 January 2006,8 was slightly 
more successful than its predecessor. This time around the Court made 
its decision in the form of a judgment. However, in four short paragraphs 
representing its entire legal reasoning, the Court held that, because the 
facts of the case in the main proceedings were anterior to Hungary’s ac-
cession to the European Union, it was not competent to decide on the 
substance of the issue.9 
In remaining extremely brief, the Court was more clement towards 
the Hungarian court than Advocate General Tizzano, who suggested that 
the Court reject the preliminary reference as partly hypothetical and 
partly unnecessary for deciding the legal issues in the main proceedings 
7 The Court of Justice draws a parallel with the fi rst Austrian request for preliminary ruling, 
which could not be described as a success, either: case C-299/95 Friedrich Kremzow v 
Republik Österreich [1997] ECR I-2629. 
8 Case C-302/04 Ynos kft v János Varga, [2006] ECR I-00371
9 What this decision means for the temporal application of Community law in the new 
Member States is discussed below in section II.1. Applying the rationale in Ynos, the Court 
of Justice rejected the third Hungarian reference (case C-261/05 Lakél Kft.) by a reasoned 
order of 9 February 2006. 
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before the domestic court.10 It may be said that the AG’s analysis is per-
suasive in many respects; the question submitted to the Court, concern-
ing abusive clauses in commercial contracts, seems somehow artifi cial.
The fi rst Polish request for a preliminary ruling11 marked a refresh-
ing change in this wave of rather dubious preliminary references. It is 
perhaps not surprising that the fi rst question from Poland was an attack 
on the Polish excise duty levied on second-hand cars imported to Poland 
from other Member States, an area of activity in which some Polish busi-
nesspeople seem to be quite successful. The request contains complex 
reasoning, arguing that by levying an excise duty on all imported sec-
ond-hand cars from other Member States, but not on second-hand cars 
already registered and resold in Poland, Articles 23, 25 and 90 TEC have 
been infringed.
Similar issues were raised in two recent Hungarian references.12 
Both cases challenge the Hungarian law on the registration duty for sec-
ond-hand cars. When a used car is purchased in another Member State, 
a person wishing to place the vehicle in circulation in Hungary (to enter it 
in the national registry of cars and have a licence issued) must pay a reg-
istration fee. The same fees must be paid on Hungarian cars when they 
are fi rst placed on the market; these normally form part of the car’s sell-
ing price. If, however, the car was originally sold fi rst in another Member 
State, and then imported into Hungary as a second-hand car, the regis-
tration fee has already been paid in the car’s state of origin. The question 
raised by the Hungarian courts is whether or not levying a registration 
fee for a second time in another Member State represents a breach of the 
fi rst paragraph of Art. 90 TEC (discriminatory taxation). 
The fi rst Czech request for a preliminary ruling, case C-437/05, 
Vorel, concerns payment for on-call duty by a hospital surgeon. All medi-
cal staff are required to serve a certain amount of on-call duty in emer-
gency medical services. For most of this time, the staff may not actually 
be working, but only waiting in “stand-by mode” for an emergency call. 
They must, however, be present at their workplace. The question which 
arose was how such “stand-by” work is to be remunerated: at the full 
rate, or at a reduced rate?13 
10 Cf. paras 52 - 70 of the Opinion of AG Tizzano of 22 September 2005 in case C-302/04 
Ynos Kft. (n 8).
11 Case C-313/05 Brzeziński (n 5).
12 Case C-290/05 Nádasdi [2005] OJ C 296/10 and case C- 333/05 Németh [2005] OJ C 
315/8 (n 4).
13 The reference is, unfortunately, poorly written, so that the real question must be inferred 
from the other documents submitted to the Court of Justice. This may not be fatal, as the 
Court could deduce, even from an improperly worded reference, the genuine issue at stake 
(cf. e.g. case 14/86 Pretore di Salo v Persons unknown [1987] ECR 2545 para 16). The same 
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What conclusions (if any) can be drawn from this handful of cases? 
Some courts might perhaps be too eager to be seen as pro-European, 
engaging in the European “judicial dialogue” at all costs, without having 
much to say. Others may be too strongly infl uenced by the attorneys ar-
guing cases before them. For an attorney, especially one representing the 
party with poorer chances of success, a request for a preliminary ruling 
and the consequent temporal transfer of the case to Luxembourg offers 
an ideal delay and fee-augmenting tactic.14 Another, somewhat psycho-
logical aspect in the case of some judges and lawyers might be the dis-
tinction of being the “fi rst” from their Member State to submit a question 
to Luxembourg. Even a very remote Community law connection is thus 
viewed as suffi cient for staying the proceedings and submitting a ques-
tion to the Court of Justice. As with the other motives, this one also does 
not guarantee the meaningfulness of the question submitted.
For perhaps similar reasons, a growing number of cases with obscure 
EC law points are being raised, together with requests for preliminary rul-
ing sent to Luxembourg. One such example: in a series of restitution cas-
es,15 the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic rejected the repeated re-
quests for preliminary ruling made by an unsuccessful claimant, a mem-
ber of the pre-WWII Czech aristocracy, who argued that the Czech courts 
deciding his restitution cases were biased and under political pressure. 
He suggested that a request for preliminary ruling be submitted regard-
ing the interpretation of Art. 6 (1) TEU, i.e. whether it was possible, in a 
particular case where political interference with the independence of the 
courts has compromised their impartiality and independence, to transfer 
the case to courts in other Member States. These requests were rejected 
issue has, however, already been addressed by the Court of Justice in case C-14/04 Ab-
delkader Dellas and Others v Premier ministre and Ministre des Affaires sociales, du Travail 
et de la Solidarité [2005] ECR I-10253, and in previous case law (cf. e.g., case C-241/99 
Confederación Intersindical Galega (CIG) v Servicio Galego de Saúde (Sergas) [2001] ECR I-
5139). It is, therefore, likely that the Court of Justice may reply with a reasoned order under 
art 104 (3) of the Rules of Procedure. 
14 A typical case of this type is currently pending before the Municipal Court in Prague (Ad-
ministrative Division). It is the case 7 Ca 193/2005. It concerns the granting of a bus line 
licence pursuant to Council Regulation (EC) no. 11/98 of 11 December 1997, amending 
Regulation (EEC) no. 684/92, on common rules for the international carriage of passengers 
by coach and bus, [1998] OJ L 4/1. The applicant, an international bus company, criticises 
the decision by the Ministry of Transportation to allow another company to provide services 
on the same line as that already granted to the applicant. The applicant has requested, in 
the action itself, suspension of the Ministry’s decision and referral of the case for prelimi-
nary reference to Luxembourg. The motivation of the request is obvious; should the Minis-
try’s decision be suspended and the case sent to Luxembourg, the applicant could forestall 
any unwelcome competition for the next two years. 
15 Order of the Supreme Court of 28 April 2005, case 28 Cdo 810/2005; order of the Su-
preme Court of 3 August 2005, case 28 Cdo 1347/2005; order of the Supreme Court of 23 
November 2005, case 28 Cdo 2420/2005; all decisions available at http://www.nsoud.cz. 
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by the Supreme Court as manifestly unfounded. Similar attempts have 
also been rejected by the Slovak Constitutional Court in a case concern-
ing jurisdictional issues under Regulation 44/2001,16 and by some other 
lower courts in the region.17 
It is vital that new Community judges, in similar types of cases, 
realise that submitting a request for preliminary ruling to Luxembourg 
is a right, not an obligation. Apart from the obligation, in certain cases 
pertaining to courts of last instance, to submit a preliminary reference to 
the Court of Justice,18 it is for the national court, which knows the facts 
of the case and the arguments of the parties, to assess the need for a pre-
liminary ruling in the given dispute.19 A national judge should not suc-
cumb to the temptation of having a case sent to, and resolved in, Luxem-
bourg; the possibility of consulting the Court of Justice does not relieve a 
national judge of his duty to apply Community law independently. 
I.2. EC law in national courts only
As already mentioned above, any systematisation of EC law issues 
currently pending or recently decided before the new Community courts 
borders on the impossible. A very rough division might be made accord-
ing to the strength of the EC law argument in the dispute. There are 
already quite a few cases in which EC law is being used as a source of 
subsidiary legal arguments, i.e. a reference to EC law confi rms the result 
reached by applying national legal provisions. These cases typically in-
volve some sort of indirect effect, especially in the area of implementing 
EC directives. 
Cases in which EC law constitutes the focal legal argument are rare. 
These mostly involve direct application of a source of Community law 
(regulations, Treaty provisions). However, before we analyse cases in the 
fi rst or second category, let us fi rst briefl y consider some “heavyweight” 
constitutional cases. 
16 Order of the Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic of 30 March 2005, case II. ÚS 
90/05-26, available at http://www.concourt.sk. 
17 Cf. e.g. the judgment of the Regional Court in Ustí nad Labem (poboËka Liberec) of 30 
September 2004 in Kinski v. MTT Company, case 35 Co 213/2004-137, unpublished. 
18 Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT and Lanifi cio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health [1982] ECR 
3415. For more, see M Bobek, Porušení povinnosti zahájit řízení o předběžné otázce podle 
Ëlánku 234 (3) SES. [Violation of the Duty to Make a Preliminary Reference under Article 234 
(3) TEC] (CH Beck, Prague 2004) 32 et seq. 
19 Cf. case 83/78 Pigs Marketing Board v Raymond Redmond [1978] ECR 2347 para 25 or 
case C-320/94 Reti Televisive Italiane SpA (RTI) v Ministero delle Poste e Telecomunicazioni 
[1996] ECR I-6471 para 21.
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I.2.1. The “big ones”
There seems to be a strange kind of inverse proportion between the 
amount of EC “constitutional cases” in the new Member States and the 
paper (or electronic pages) devoted to discussing them. European Arrest 
Warrant decisions seem to take centre stage,20 followed by classic pri-
macy-related cases21 and Constitutional and Accession Treaty disputes.22 
These cases will not be discussed in this paper. First of all, reference 
can be made to more elucidating comments on this subject.23 Also, de-
spite their political “weight”, cases of this type are marginal in terms of 
day-to-day application and effective enforcement of EU law in the new 
Member States. Such cases come up once or twice in a decade, and they 
are always unique. They are dealt with exclusively at the supreme or con-
stitutional level of the national adjudicative machinery. To put this more 
plainly, the overall majority of, say, Polish citizens are not concerned with 
the validity of the European Arrest Warrant and ideas about European 
constitutional pluralism, intriguing as these may be; rather, they are in-
terested in whether or not the excise duty on any car imported from other 
Member States violates the ban on discriminatory taxation under Art. 90 
ECT.24 
20 Cf. e.g. the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 27 April 2005, case P 1/05, 
available at http://www.trybunal.gov.pl; the decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic 
of Cyprus of 7 November 2005, case 294/2005; and also the decision of the Federal German 
Constitutional Court of 18 July 2005, case 2 BvR 2236/04, available at http://www.bverfg.
de. The question concerning the validity of the European Arrest Warrant is now pending 
before the Court of Justice on a preliminary reference made by the Belgian Cour d’Arbitrage 
in case C-303/05 Advocaten voor de Wereld, [2005] OJ C 271/14. The question is also 
pending before the Czech Constitutional Court in case Pl. ÚS 66/04, submitted by a group 
of senators and deputies of the Czech Parliament.
21 Cf. the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 11 May 2005, case K 18/04, at 
http://www.trybunal.gov.pl.
22 Cf. e.g. the pending challenge before the Slovak Constitutional Court to Slovak Act of Par-
liament no. 1596 of 11 May 2005, whereby Parliament approved ratifi cation of the Treaty 
on the Constitution for Europe. A constitutional complaint was fi led on 8 June 2005 by the 
Christian Democrats and the Conservative Party. They argue that the Act of the Parliament 
was unconstitutional, as Parliament was bound to hold a referendum on the Constitution 
for Europe. 
23 See e.g. K Kowalik-Bańczyk, ‘Should We Polish It Up? The Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
and the Idea of Supremacy of EU Law’.(2005) 6 German Law Journal 1355, available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.org; J Komárek, ‘Pluralismo constitucional europeo tras la 
ampliación. Un análisis de la jurisprudencia comunitaria del Tribunal Constitucional po-
laco’ (2005) 16 Revista española de Derecho Europeo; J Weigend, T Górski, ‘Die Implemen-
tierung des Europäischen Haftbefehls in das polnische Strafrecht’ (2005) 117 Zeitschrift für 
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft 193, pp 196-197; A Łazowski, ‘Constitutional Tribunal 
on the Surrender of Polish Citizens under the European Arrest Warrant. Decision of 27 
April 2005’ (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 569. 
24 Case C-313/05, Brzeziński, see n.5. 
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There is, however, one constitutional law case which stands out 
from the crowd of accession and EAW case law. This is the Slovak Con-
stitutional Court’s decision of 18 October 200525 concerning Slovak im-
plementation of Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on the 
principle of equal treatment of persons irrespective of racial or ethnic 
origin.26 Art. 5 of the Directive allows for positive action by “[…] maintain-
ing or adopting specifi c measures to prevent or compensate for disad-
vantages linked to racial or ethnic origin.” This provision was transposed 
almost verbatim into Art. 8, para. 8 of Slovakia’s Act implementing the 
Directive,27 having been inserted into the original government proposal 
by the Slovak Parliament (National Council). The government then chal-
lenged the Act before the Constitutional Court, arguing that the inserted 
positive action provision was in violation of Art. 12 (equality) and Art. 1 
(rule of law) of the Slovak Constitution. The Court allowed the complaint 
and annulled the contested Art. 8, para. 8 of the Act. 
The decision itself addressed points of EC law only marginally.28 More 
interesting is the forerunner to the decision on the merits of the case, i.e. 
the Court’s order of 18 May 2005,29 whereby the Constitutional Court 
rejected the Slovak Parliament’s motion for preliminary reference to the 
Court of Justice. The Constitutional Court considered itself to be a “court 
or tribunal” within the meaning of Art. 234 TEC.30 It did not, however, 
consider a request for preliminary ruling to be necessary in order to de-
cide the case in question.31 The Slovak Constitutional Court thus actively 
25 Plenary decision of the Constitutional Court of 18 October 2005, case Pl. ÚS 8/04-202, 
n.y.p., available at http://www.concourt.sk.
26 OJ [2000] L 180/22. 
27 Zákon Ë. 365/2004 Z.z. o rovnakom zaobchádzaní v. niektorých oblastiach a o ochrane 
pred diskrimináciou a o zmene a doplnení niektorých zákonov (antidiskrimina ný zákon). 
28 Citing in para 18 of the decision, the Court’s case law in case C-222/84 Marguerite 
Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 and case 
C-285/98 Tanja Kreil v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000] ECR I-69, wherein the Court 
inferred that any provisions derogating from the principle of equality by the use of positive 
action must be interpreted strictly. 
29 Case no. PL ÚS 8/04-196, available at http:// www.concourt.sk.
30 This reading of the decision was confi rmed by the Chief Justice of the Constitutional 
Court, Mr. Jan Mazák, writing extra-judicially in: J Mazák, ‘The Constitutional Court of 
the Slovak Republic and its Contribution to the Enforcement of Rights and Obligations 
Created at the Community Level’. In: ‘1 Jahr EU Mitgliedschaft: Erste Bilanz aus der Sicht 
der Slowakischen Höchstgerichte’, (Eif Working Paper Series, Working Paper Nr. 18, Öster-
reichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 2005) 3, and also in J Mazák, ‘Príspevok 
Ústavného súdu Slovenskej republiky pri uplatńování práv. a plnení povinností na komu-
nitárnej úrovni’ (2005) 6 EMP Jurisprudence 11-14. 
31 In which the Court dodged rather than really resolved the question. It may reasonably be 
argued that there was a strong EC law issue at stake, namely, the proper construction of 
art 5 of the Directive, or questions concerning the validity thereof. What the Constitutional 
Court did was not to challenge the Directive directly (for which it would have had to submit 
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entered the debate about whether or not constitutional courts are courts 
within the meaning of Art. 234 TEC, and thus can (and should) submit 
requests for preliminary ruling to Luxembourg. The Czech Constitutional 
Court recently adopted a similar view: in its seminal decision on the ef-
fect of EC law in the Czech Republic,32 the Court observed that it could 
be a court or tribunal in the meaning of Art. 234 TEC. The Court decided, 
however, that there was no need, in the case in question, to submit a 
request for preliminary ruling to Luxembourg.33 
I.2.2. EC (EU) law as the decisive legal argument
There are only a handful of cases in which an EC law argument 
seems to be the decisive one. Two scenarios may be considered here:
(1) EC legislation covers the area of law in question exclusively, while 
the use of national law is only subsidiary, i.e. national law covers only 
procedure or sanctions, but there is no confl ict of substantive rules (typi-
cally, in areas like competition law, customs, or agriculture).
(2) There is a confl ict between EC regulations and national legal pro-
visions, which is to be resolved based on the primacy of EC law over con-
fl icting national provisions. 
Examples from the fi rst category do not require any detailed expla-
nation. Where there are no national regulations in the given area, and 
judges are called on to interpret and apply EC law directly, there are usu-
ally no problems, apart from questions related to language accessibility 
and knowledge, which will be dealt with below. 
a request for preliminary ruling concerning its validity to Luxembourg), but rather to annul 
its domestic implementation. 
32 Decision (full court) of the Czech Constitutional Court of 8 March 2006 in case Pl.ÚS 
50/04 (the “Sugar Quota” case), not yet published. Of similar importance is the order (full 
court) of 21 February 2006 in case Pl.ÚS 19/04, in which the Constitutional Court held 
that courts of general jurisdiction must deal with EC law issues directly or in cooperation 
with the Court of Justice, and not on the basis of a reference (constitutional reference) to 
the Constitutional Court. 
33 The forerunner to this debate is the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht), which had already held in 1979, in BVerfGE 52, 187 - “Vielleicht”-Beschluß 
(25.07.1979), that it was a court or tribunal within the meaning of art 234 TEC. However, 
the Bundesverfassungsgericht never submitted a request for preliminary ruling itself. A 
different approach was taken by the Austrian Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfas-
sungsgerichtshof), which has addressed the Court of Justice on several occasions already 
(cf. e.g. case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GbmH, Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke 
GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Kärnten [2002] ECR I-8365; case C-465/00 Rechnung-
shof v Österreichischer Rundfunk E. A. [2003] ECR I-04989; or case C-171/01 Wählergruppe 
„Gemeinsam Zajedno/Birlikte Alternative und Grüne GewerkschafterInnen/UG“, and Bunde-
sminister für Wirtschaft und Arbeit and Others [2003] ECR I-4301). 
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Examples of such direct use of EC law concern diverse areas: compe-
tition law,34 asylum and migration,35 transportation policy, or customs.36 
One often neglected area of the direct application of EC law is civil coop-
eration in judicial matters, especially the domestic application of Council 
Regulation 44/200137 and Council Regulation 1348/2000.38
 The potential primacy cases are more intriguing. At the time this 
paper was written, there had not yet been a single case in which a Czech 
or other Visegrad state court had explicitly accorded EC law primacy over 
national law.39 There are, however, indications that similar questions 
will have to be confronted sooner or later. Examples of this type of case 
law include the national wine tax, a measure whose effect is potentially 
equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports,40 a challenge before 
the Constitutional Court to the new Czech Public Healthcare Insurance 
Act,41 or the contentious issue of the legality of sanctions for violating the 
34 The area of competition law, especially following the entry into force of Modernisation 
Regulation 1/2003, is without any doubt the most “Community-friendly” area of municipal 
law. Both the Czech regulatory agency (Offi ce for the Protection of Competition) and the 
administrative courts reviewing that agency’s decisions commonly work with EC legislation 
and Court of Justice case law. 
35 Judgment of the Městský soud v. Praze (Municipal Court in Prague (Administrative divi-
sion)) of 20 June 2005, case 7 A 7/2005, unpublished. The case concerned a Slovak woman 
who had requested the granting of political asylum in the Czech Republic. The Municipal 
Court dismissed her application without examining the merits of the case, directly applying 
the Protocol annexed to the Treaty of the European Community - the Protocol on Asylum for 
Nationals of Member States of the European Union ([1997] OJ C 340/103). 
36 Case 7 Ca 193/2005, pending before the Municipal Court in Prague (Administrative Divi-
sion). For more, see supra note 15.
37 Council Regulation (EC) no. 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, [2001] OJ L 12/1.
38 Council Regulation (EC) no. 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 on the service of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters in the Member States, [2000] OJ L 
160/37. 
39 Or at least the confl ict was not directly recognised. It could be argued that, in the previ-
ously mentioned case of the Slovak asylum-seeker (see n. 35), the Protocol on Asylum for 
Nationals of Member States of the European Union took primacy over the Czech Asylum 
Act. The issue was, however, construed differently: according to the Municipal Court’s rea-
soning, the Protocol was lex specialis to the general Czech Asylum Act (lex generalis). As 
such, no direct confl ict arose, as it could be argued that the special situation of an asylum-
seeker from Slovakia had not been provided for in Czech law. 
40 Case 30 Ca 131/2005, pending before the Regional Court in Brno, Czech Republic. The 
case raises some complex issues concerning the Act on Accession as well as the previous 
Europe Agreements. The applicant, a Czech wine importer, argues that redistribution of 
the revenues of the National Wine Fund, which are given solely to Czech wine producers, 
and not to importers of wine from other Member States, is discriminatory and constitutes 
a measure whose effect is equivalent to a quantitative restriction on imports. If the court 
were to allow the applicant’s claim, it would have to disapply national legislation (an act of 
Parliament) which is in violation of the Europe Agreement. 
41 Cases Pl 16/2005, Pl. 35/2005 and Pl. 36/2005, all currently pending before the Con-
stitutional Court. 
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Common Customs Tariff where this has not been duly published in the 
offi cial language of the Member State.42 
The bitter ongoing judicial saga concerning Czechoslovak pensions 
has a rather uncertain EC law status. The facts of this case reach back 
to the pre-1993 Czechoslovak Federation. Upon the division of the former 
Czechoslovakia, one of the separation-related treaties between the suc-
cessor states provided for social security and pension benefi ts following 
separation. The basic rule adopted was that a pension should be paid by 
the state on whose territory the legal entity a person had worked for was 
incorporated, or, if the person was self-employed, by the state on whose 
territory he or she had worked.43 
With the gradual divergence of economic conditions in the two suc-
cessor states, pensions paid to people who had worked on the territory of 
the Czech Republic became considerably higher than those paid to peo-
ple who had worked in Slovakia. This situation was especially burden-
some for some Czech nationals, who had always had Czech citizenship 
and had worked for Czech companies on the territory of Slovakia. These 
people, most of whom lived in the Czech Republic after retirement, were 
only entitled to considerably lower Slovak pensions, despite the fact that 
they were Czech citizens who had worked for Czech fi rms. 
Following a series of constitutional complaints,44 the Czech Consti-
tutional Court decided that Czech citizens working for Czech fi rms in 
Slovakia cannot be said to have worked abroad, and that their pension 
claims should be calculated based on their Czech citizenship. The court 
held that any other conclusion would violate the constitutional imperative 
of equality and equal access to social security. All Czech citizens should, 
therefore, be entitled to the same pensions, irrespective of whether they 
worked on Czech or Slovak territory prior to the split of the Czechoslovak 
Federation.
This approach has been rejected by the Czech administrative judici-
ary thus far.45 The main argument of the administrative courts, headed 
by the Czech Supreme Administrative Court, is that entitlements under 
social security laws cannot be based on citizenship, but rather on territo-
riality and a person’s actual place of work. In its decisions on this issue, 
42 For more, see infra, section II.2. 
43 Art 20 of the Smlouva mezi »eskou republikou a Slovenskou republikou o sociálním za-
bezpeËení [Treaty on Social Security between the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic], 
published in the Czech Collection of Laws as no. 228/1993 Coll.
44 Cf. the decision of 3 June 2003, case II. ÚS 405/02; the decision of 25 January 2005, 
case III. ÚS 252/04; or the decision of 4 April 2005, case IV. ÚS 158/04, all available at 
http://www.judikatura.cz. 
45 Cf. the judgment of 19 February 2004, case 3 Ads 2/2003-60, or the judgment of 23 
February 2005, case 6 Ads 62/2003-31, available at http://www.nssoud.cz.
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the Supreme Administrative Court has referred to Community legislation 
in this area,46 which emphasises the notion of residence, not citizenship. 
It could be argued that the approach chosen by the Constitutional Court 
is in breach of Community rules, as it establishes de facto discrimination 
based on nationality. On the other hand, the facts and the legal regime in 
question date back a time long before Czech and Slovak accession to the 
European Union, the group of people concerned is a closed one, and the 
case refers to an extraordinary situation conditioned by the dissolution 
of a state. The newly-adopted stance of the Court of Justice in Ynos kft47 
would seem to imply that these questions are to be regarded as outside 
the scope of Community law. 
I.2.3. EC law as an interpretive aid
Instances where EC law is used as an interpretive aid are quite com-
mon. The majority of these cases concern the indirect effect of direc-
tives.48 Directives are used as an interpretive aid to discern the meaning 
of national legislation adopted in order to transpose these same directives 
into the national legal order. Cases of this sort may involve the portability 
of mobile phone numbers,49 late payments in commercial transactions,50 
issues concerning the nature of fi nancial leasing,51 or whether or not the 
Czech Airport Administration Agency is a “public undertaking” for the 
purposes of administrative judicial review.52 
46 Council Regulation (EEC) no. 1408/71 of 14 June 1971 on the application of social secu-
rity schemes to employed persons and their families moving within the Community, [1971] 
OJ L 149/2, as (frequently) amended. 
47 See below, section II.1.
48 S Prechal, Directives in EC Law (2nd Ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005)184 et 
seq.
49 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of the Czech Republic of 27 September 
2005, case 1 Ao 1/2005-98 (available at http://www.nssoud.cz), which relied on Directive 
2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service 
and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal 
Service Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/51 in order to determine the regulatory aim of number 
portability. 
50 Judgment of the District Court in Kladno, Czech Republic, of 19 July 2005, case 16 C 
109/2004-42, unpublished, which drew interpretative help from Directive 2000/35/EC of 
the European Parliament and Council of 29 June 2000 on combating late payment in com-
mercial transactions [2000] OJ L 200/35. 
51 Judgment of the Municipal Court in Prague (Civil Division) of 4 January 2005, case 8 CA 
6/2004-24, unpublished. The issue was whether or not fi nancial leasing is to be regarded 
as a type of consumer credit falling within the scope of Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 
December 1986 for the approximation of laws, regulations and administrative provisions of 
Member States concerning consumer credit [1987]OJ L 42/48.
52 Judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 17 January 2006, case 6 As 52/2004 
- 67, n.y.p., where the court relied on Commission Directive 80/723/EEC of 25 June 1980 
on the transparency of fi nancial relations between Member States and public undertakings 
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This sort of interpretive aid need not be limited to issues arising after 
a new Member State’s accession to the European Union. The Polish Con-
stitutional Tribunal,53 the Czech Constitutional Court,54 the Czech High 
Court in Olomouc55 and the Czech Supreme Administrative Court56 have 
all, on several occasions already, observed that EU law may also serve 
as an interpretive guide in cases based on pre-accession facts and legal 
norms. 
A recent decision by the Czech Supreme Administrative Court is 
instructive in this respect. The case arose from a rather technical val-
ue-added tax dispute. The complainant, an undertaking taxable under 
Czech law, reconstructed a glass-welding unit on a property located in 
Slovakia. The reconstruction contract between the complainant and the 
Slovak property owner was concluded at the incentive of a third party, 
a Czech undertaking, which acted as the property owner’s agent. The 
complainant later claimed deduction of value-added tax (VAT) from the 
fee paid to the agent before the Czech authorities, as both parties to the 
agency agreement were Czech. The Czech Revenue Authority, however, 
refused to deduct VAT from the agency contract, claiming that the place 
of the taxable transaction was Slovakia, where the property was located. 
The Supreme Administrative Court observed that the issue in ques-
tion had not been provided for in the Czech Value-Added Tax Act of 1992, 
which was in force at the time of the dispute. However, the court went on 
to state that the Czech Republic’s VAT system, introduced at the begin-
ning of the Nineties, had been modelled on examples from the EC. The 
rules of confl ict for determining the place of the taxable transaction un-
der the Czech VAT system were designed similarly to EC ones. A compari-
son of the relevant provisions of the Czech VAT Act and the Sixth Council 
[1980] OJ L 195/35, and the Court of Justice’s case law interpreting the notion of a “public 
undertaking”. 
53 Cf. e.g. the decision of 29 September 1997, case K 15/976, published in the Constitu-
tional Tribunal Reports (Orzecznictwo Trybuna≥u Konstytucyjnego. Zbiór Urzędowy, abbre-
viated as OTK ZU), 3-4/1997, no. 37; the decision of 28 March 2000, case K 27/997, OTK 
ZU 2/2000, no. 62; the decision of 24 October 2000, case K 12/008, OTK ZU 7/2000, no. 
255; the decision of 21 April 2004, case K 33/039, OTK ZU 4A/2004, no. 31; the decision 
of 31 May 2004, case K 15/0410, OTK ZU 5A/2004, no. 47; the decision of 12 January 
2005, case K 24/0412, OTK ZU 1A/2005, no. 3; or the decision of 26 January 2005, case 
P 10/0413, OTK ZU 1A/2005, no. 7.
54 Cf. the decision of 29 May 1997, case III. ÚS 31/97 (the “©koda Auto” case), published in 
the Constitutional Court Reports (Sbírka nálezu° a usnesení Ústavního soudu), Vol. 8, no. 
66, p. 149; the decision of 16 October 2001, case Pl. ÚS 5/01 (the “Milk Quota” case), pub-
lished as 410/2001 Coll.; or the decision of 6 March 2002, case Pl. ÚS 11/01 (the “Czech 
Railway Act” case), published as 144/2002 Coll.
55 Decision of the High Court in Olomouc of 14 November 1996, published in Právní ro-
zhledy (Legal Horizons) C.H. Beck, Prague, (1997) no. 9, p. 484. 
56 Cf. the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 29 September 2005, case 2 Afs 
92/2005-43, available at http://www.nssoud.cz. 
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Directive 77/388/EEC on harmonisation of VAT was, therefore, appro-
priate, also taking into account the fact that the European Association 
Agreement had already required the approximation of certain areas of 
Czech law - including indirect taxation - to EC standards. The Supreme 
Administrative Court therefore affi rmed the possibility of using EC law as 
an instrument for interpreting approximated Czech legislation, and ap-
plied the Sixth Directive and the Court of Justice’s case law. 
The indirect use of EC law as a tool for interpreting Czech approxi-
mated legislation, even when the latter was adopted prior to the Czech 
Republic’s accession to the EU, is not a new concept. The possibility 
of such indirect interpretive use had already been upheld by the Czech 
Constitutional Court in its pre-accession case law. The Constitutional 
Court’s approach was based not on the approximation of technical rules, 
but rather on common European principles and values: 
[…] The Constitutional Court […] does not share the claimants’ opinion 
that Community law is irrelevant to the Constitutional Court of the 
Czech Republic, i.e. a state outside the European Union, when as-
sessing constitutionality. Such a statement is unduly simplistic and 
schematic. One of the sources of primary Community law are the com-
mon principles of law which the Court of Justice derives from the con-
stitutional traditions of the Member States of the European Union. […] 
The Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic has repeatedly applied 
these common principles of law, which are not expressly set forth as 
written legal rules, but are applied in European legal culture (e.g. the 
principle of proportionality). […] Primary Community law is thus not 
foreign to the Constitutional Court; rather, to a great extent - especially 
in the form of common European principles of law - it permeates the 
Court’s decisional practice.57
II. Problem Areas
After this rather mosaic-like overview of cases, let us focus on three 
selected issues in greater detail. They represent areas where the appli-
cation of EC law in the new Member States is facing considerable chal-
lenges. 
II.1. Time and temporality
Unless otherwise provided for in transitional arrangements, Euro-
pean law becomes fully and immediately applicable in all new Member 
57 Decision of the Constitutional Court of 16 October 2001, case Pl. ÚS 5/01 (the “Milk 
Quota” case), published as 410/2001 Sb., p 8902. 
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States as of their date of accession.58 Its effects are to be prospective, i.e. 
it should apply to new facts and situations. Existing situations and legal 
relationships that have not fully exhausted their legal effects are indi-
rectly modifi ed with respect to the content of existing rights and obliga-
tions. The deliberations of national courts should be made in light of the 
following principles:
(1) Priority shall be given to express transitional solutions. 
(2) In the absence of these, there is the presumptive rule against retroac-
tivity: the substantive rules of Community law must be interpreted 
as applicable to situations established before their entry into force 
only insofar as it clearly follows from their terms, objectives or gen-
eral scheme that such an effect must be recognised.
(3) New rules apply immediately to the future effects of an existing situ-
ation which arose under the old rules (principle of immediate effect). 
A situation is considered existing (pending, current), and therefore 
covered by immediately applicable rules, if it has not exhausted its 
legal effects prior to the entry into force of new legislation, but rather 
continues to produce them as of that date.
(4) Legitimate expectations must be protected. These may form an ex-
ception to the application of the principle of immediate effect.59 
Unfortunately, real life does not follow such clear-cut patterns, and 
much uncertainty remains in resolving inter-temporal issues. Most of the 
current EC law cases in the new Member States also involve questions 
concerning post-accession temporal application of EC law. One example 
of this type of dispute is a case pending before the High Court in Prague.60 
It concerns the application of Council Regulation (EC) no. 1346/2000 of 
29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings.61 The Regulation provides for 
main insolvency proceedings to be initiated in the Member State which 
constitutes the centre of the debtor’s main interests. No additional insol-
vency proceedings should be opened in any other Member State. How-
ever, this new regime has applied only since accession. Before accession, 
58 Cf. art 2 of the Act Concerning the Conditions of Accession of the Czech Republic, the 
Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithua-
nia, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of 
Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and Adjustments to the Treaties on Which the European 
Union Is Founded, [2003] OJ C 227 E. Cf. case C-122/96 Stephen Austin Saldanha and 
MTS Securities Corporation v. Hiross Holding AG [1997] ECR I-5325 para 14, or case 258/81 
Metallurgiki Halyps A.E. v Commission of the European Communities [1982] ECR 4261 para 
8. 
59 In: SL Kaleda, ‘Immediate Effect of Community Law in the New Member States: Is There 
a Place for a Consistent Doctrine?’ (2004) European Law Journal, Vol. 10, no. 1, 102-122, 
108. 
60 Case no. 12 Cmo 257/2005. 
61 [2000] OJ L 160/1.
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Czech courts did not recognise insolvency proceedings in foreign coun-
tries, and the assets of an insolvent company on Czech territory were 
wound up independently of any other proceedings pending abroad. 
Deciding this issue under the old procedure, the Municipal Court 
in Prague, as the court of fi rst instance, opened insolvency proceedings 
against an Austrian company in April 2004, irrespective of the fact that 
insolvency proceedings had already begun in Vienna. At the time when 
this conclusion was reached by the court of fi rst instance, such a deci-
sion was perfectly legal. If the line of analysis outlined above is to apply, 
can the insolvency of a company be called an existing and lasting situ-
ation? Since the assets of the company have not yet been wound up, it 
might be argued that the new rules should now be applicable to them; 
the appeals court should stay the proceedings and wait for the Austrian 
court to decide the issue. However, in order to do so, the High Court 
would have to quash the decision of the Municipal Court opening insol-
vency proceedings in the Czech Republic in April 2004. The question that 
arises is on what grounds the High Court could do so. The earlier deci-
sion by the Municipal Court was in accordance with the legal situation 
prior to accession, and the appellate court is bound by the legal situation 
prevailing at the time when the original decision was made.
It may be argued that in case C-302/04, Ynos, as discussed above, 
the Court of Justice missed a chance to clarify at least some temporality 
issues. The Court declined to reply to the question raised by the Hungar-
ian judge, with the following reasoning (para. 35 - 37):
It must, however, be pointed out that the order for reference states 
that the facts in the main proceedings occurred before the Republic 
of Hungary acceded to the European Union. The Court has jurisdic-
tion to interpret the Directive only as regards its application in a new 
Member State with effect from the date of that State’s accession to the 
European Union (see, to that effect, case C-321/97, Andersson and 
Wåkerås-Andersson [1999] ECR I-3551, paragraph 31).
In this case, as the facts of the dispute in the main proceedings oc-
curred prior to the Republic of Hungary’s accession to the European 
Union, the Court does not have jurisdiction to interpret the Directive.
The opinion of the Court is surprisingly unconditional and categori-
cal. It draws a fi rm line as to where the facts of the dispute lie. Since the 
case arose from a situation that occurred before Hungary’s accession to 
the European Union, the Court is not competent to decide.
There is no doubt that the Court was correct in refusing to answer 
this rather dubious request for preliminary ruling from Hungary. How-
ever, since the Court decided to render a judgement in the case (and not 
dispose of it by means of an order, as suggested by the Advocate General), 
it could have seized this chance to reiterate and consolidate its position 
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on the temporal effects of EU law in the new Member States. Such guid-
ance is much needed in the new Member States at present. 
Moreover, designating the circumstance that the facts of the case 
were anterior to Hungary’s accession to the EU as the sole determinant 
of the Court’s competence could be misleading. There are situations in 
which the facts have occurred prior to accession, yet the resulting le-
gal effects are lasting and there is an ongoing legal relationship between 
the parties. In similar situations, the content of the legal relationship is 
modifi ed by EU law, which becomes applicable irrespective of when the 
key events occurred. The determining factor is thus not whether the facts 
of the case occurred before or after accession, but whether or not there is 
a lasting, ongoing legal relationship still producing legal effects.
Similar interpretive problems arise in situations where some facts 
making up the legal relationship in question arose before accession, and 
some after. Legal relationships are often complex conglomerates of vari-
ous legal facts that extend and develop over long periods of time. What if 
some of the facts of the case occurred prior to accession, and some after 
it?62 
The facts anterior/posterior to accession analysis also disregards the 
huge mass of legislation adopted in the new Member States prior to ac-
cession with a view to harmonising national law with Community rules.63 
Hundreds of pieces of legislation had de facto already implemented Com-
munity legislation (most typically directives) before accession, while ac-
cession itself had no impact on their content. The national courts have 
62 Case 31 Ca 100/2005, pending before the Regional Court in Hradec Králové, Czech 
Republic. The case concerns the reimbursement of customs duties. A Czech importer im-
ported a great quantity of mozzarella cheese from Italy. The contract between the Czech 
importer and the Italian producer was concluded shortly before Czech accession to the EU. 
The cheese was then imported into the Czech Republic, and the customs duty paid. After 
the date of accession, the importer discovered that the cheese was mouldy, and rescinded 
the contract. The question arising was whether or not Community law is applicable to this 
kind of situation; what are the legal facts of the case? The contract was concluded and ex-
ecuted prior to accession, while the rescission and liability issues arose from facts posterior 
to accession. Similar questions arise with regard to longstanding legal relationships, where 
new facts emerge over a longer period of time, and the relationship itself may last for dec-
ades (pension schemes, employment contracts and the like). 
63 The Ynos case is one of these (n 8): the piece of legislation in question was Council Direc-
tive 93/13/EEC on unfair terms in consumer contracts ([1993] OJ L95/29). By virtue of art 
67 and 68 of the Association Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and the Euro-
pean Communities and its Member States ([1993] OJ L 347/2), Hungary had been obliged 
to harmonise its legislation before accession to the EU, including the area of consumer 
protection. Hungary honoured this obligation by amending its Civil Code in 1994, thus de 
facto implementing the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive. Virtually the same 
situation existed in the Czech Republic, where implementation of the Directive was carried 
out prior to accession by means of an amendment to the Civil Code. 
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already recognised this fact,64 and have used Community legislation as 
an interpretive aid in cases prior to accession, as well as in cases decided 
after accession but with facts existing prior thereto. 
It may be argued that a smooth, gradual approach to the temporal 
effects of EC law, as adopted by some national courts, is preferable to 
the abrupt, all-or-nothing division which could be inferred from the Ynos 
case. There is no doubt that the Court’s position will have to be more 
fi nely tuned in future case law.65 
It is certainly true, on the other hand, that Ynos pertains solely to the 
Court of Justice’s competence. Nothing precludes national courts from 
using Community legislation as an interpretive aid in cases with facts an-
terior to accession, as they have been doing for the last few years. None-
theless, the Ynos ruling might have a certain cooling-off effect on national 
judges in terms of applying Community law.66 First, not all judges will be 
able to make this fi ne distinction and recognise that Ynos was about the 
Court of Justice’s competence to answer preliminary ruling requests from 
the new Member States, and not primarily about how national courts are 
to apply Community law following accession. Second, the Ynos decision 
might also be used as a basis for deliberately deferring full application of 
Community law in cases where not all the facts of the case are posterior 
to accession. 
II.2. The legal force of Babel
An even more intriguing problem regarding full application of Com-
munity law in the new Member States stems from the fact that translation 
and publication of Community legislation is delayed or even completely 
lacking. Art. 2 of the Act of Accession provides that “[f]rom the date of 
accession, the provisions of the original Treaties and the acts adopted by 
the institutions and the European Central Bank before accession shall be 
binding on the new Member States and shall apply in those States under 
the conditions laid down in those Treaties and in this Act.” 
According to Art. 58 of the Act, “[t]he texts of the acts of the insti-
tutions, and of the European Central Bank, adopted before accession 
and drawn up by the Council, the Commission or the European Central 
64 See the cases discussed supra, section I.2.3.
65 It will also have to be clarifi ed with respect to the Court’s previous case law, such as case 
C-302/97 Klaus Konle v Republik Österreich [1999] ECR I-3099, where the Court saw no 
problem in answering preliminary ruling requests whose facts arose prior to Austria’s ac-
cession to the European Union. 
66 Especially if the Court of Justice maintains its tough stance of declaring all preliminary 
ruling requests from new Member States inadmissible because the facts of the case lie an-
terior to accession; cf. the reasoned order of the Court of 9 February 2006 in case C-261/05 
Lakép e.a. (n 4)
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Bank in the Czech, Estonian, Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Polish, Slovak and Slovenian languages shall, from the date of accession, 
be authentic under the same conditions as the texts drawn up in the 
present eleven languages. They shall be published in the Offi cial Jour-
nal of the European Union if the texts in the present languages were so 
published.”
Read conjointly, both articles oblige the institutions which have is-
sued these acts to publish their offi cial translations in the offi cial lan-
guages of the new Member States in the Offi cial Journal of the European 
Union. These translated acts of the institutions were to be published as a 
Special Edition of the Offi cial Journal. What, however, is the exact moment 
at which such translated legislation becomes binding and enforceable vis-
à-vis the individual? Is it the moment of accession, or the moment when it 
is actually published in the language of the respective Member State?
This question is not merely academic. Due to the considerable work-
load and amount of legislation, publication of the Special Edition was 
delayed. The printed volumes of the Offi cial Journal, which are the only 
binding source of EC legislation, were “displayed”67 only after accession 
took place. Of the total of 230 volumes planned for publication, only 
171 had been published as of 28 November 2005.68 This means that not 
all the legislation which entered into force on the day of accession, and 
which is being enforced by institutions of the Member States and the 
Community, has been duly published yet. 
The type of disputes that result are well illustrated by a case pending 
before the Regional Court in Ostrava (Administrative Division), Czech Re-
public.69 The applicant is an importer of red wine who, on 30 September 
2004, was fi ned by the Czech customs authority for incorrect customs 
declarations during the period from 11 March 2004 to 20 May 2004. Be-
fore 1 May 2004, the basis for imposing a fi ne was the Czech Customs 
Code; following accession, the legal basis for a fi ne was the Community 
Common Customs Tariff, or Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 
of 2 July 1993, which sets forth provisions for implementation of Coun-
cil Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs 
Code.70
67 I.e. offi cially published; the moment of display of a given issue of the Offi cial Journal in 
the Offi ce for Offi cial Publications is deemed to be the moment of its publication. See case 
98/78 A.Racke v Hauptzollamt Mainz [1979] ECR 69 para 17. 
68 Information provided, with respect to the Czech Special Edition, by Mr. TL Cranfi eld, 
Director-General of the Offi ce for Offi cial Publications of the European Communities, in a 
letter dated 28 November 2005. 
69 Case 22 Ca 69/2005. The Ostrava Regional Court has stayed the proceedings and sub-
mitted a request for preliminary ruling on this very issue by order no. 22 Ca 69/2005-43 
of 10 February 2006. 
70 [1993] OJ L 253/1.
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The applicant challenged the fi ne before the administrative court, 
inter alia on the grounds that the fi ne was imposed on the basis of a Com-
munity regulation which had not been translated and published in the 
Czech language at the time the act was committed. The statement of facts 
made by the applicant is correct: the Common Customs Tariff, together 
with the Commission Regulation, was not published in the Czech Special 
Edition of the Offi cial Journal until August 2004. 
The respondent, i.e. the customs authority, rejected the applicant’s 
argument as abusive. In its point of view, the whole of Community law 
became binding on all individuals at the very moment of accession, irre-
spective of whether or not it had been published in Czech. The respond-
ent further argued that a provisional Czech translation was available on 
the Ministry of Finance’s website, so that the applicant could have had 
access to it there. 
This case demonstrates two problems. The fi rst is delayed publica-
tion of the legislation in question, and the legislative chaos caused by 
accession. The second problem is the broader issue of the discrepancy 
between formal and material sources of law. 
Starting with the latter issue, the gap between formal and actual 
sources of law is obvious. Modern legal systems are based on the con-
cept of the exclusivity of published (printed) sources of law. The “rules of 
recognition” suggest a given form of publishing and promulgating legal 
rules. The Community rule of recognition is Council Regulation no. 1, 
which defi nes the languages to be used by the European Economic Com-
munity, together with Art. 254 ECT.71 This regulation provides for the 
publication of all acts of Community institutions in the respective lan-
guage version of the Offi cial Journal. Due publication is a precondition 
for the legal validity of an act.72 Furthermore, the act must be published 
in a language that the addressee is able to understand, i.e. the offi cial 
language of the Member State in question.73 
It seems, however, that these “rules of recognition” are somewhat 
outdated. The vast majority of Community law users have almost never 
seen a printed version of the Offi cial Journal. Various electronic legal 
databases have become the genuine sources of law, and the closest one 
gets to the Offi cial Journal is by downloading an electronic “pdf” version 
71 [1958] OJ 17/385, English Special Edition: Series I, chapter 1952-1958, 59.
72 Cf. case T-115/94 Opel Austria GmbH v Council of the European Union [1997] ECR II-39 
paras 127-135; generally, see case 98/78 Racke (n 67). 
73 See case 160/84 Oryzomyli Kavallas OEE and others v Commission of the European Com-
munities [1986] ECR 1633, body 11 - 21; case C-108/01Consorzio del Prosciutto di Parma 
and Salumifi cio S. Rita SpA v Asda Stores Ltd and Hygrade Foods Ltd.[2003] ECR I-5121 
para 89; and case C-209/96 United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v Com-
mission of the European Communities [1998] ECR I-5655 para 35. 
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of it from the EUR-Lex website. The key question at this stage is whether 
or not the exclusivity of printed sources of law is to be maintained. Once 
we accept that the source of Community law need not necessarily be the 
printed version of the Offi cial Journal,74 the clear wording of the statutory 
provisions notwithstanding, what remains is the question of language. 
The publication of an act in the language of the Member State in question 
(as far as legislative acts are concerned), or in the language of the ad-
dressee of the act (for administrative or individual acts), is a precondition 
that is diffi cult to bypass.
There is no doubt that the Court of Justice will, sooner or later, be 
faced with similar questions. The same set of problems is evident in all 
the Member States:75 translations of Community legislation are delayed 
or non-existent, and there were no offi cial (and single-version) transla-
tions of Community legislation available either shortly before or, especial-
ly, immediately after accession. What resulted was a great deal of chaos, 
in which, for instance, state authorities enforcing basic Community laws 
(such as the Common Customs Tariff, in the present case) made use of 
unoffi cial translations (ideally, in just one version) of Community law, or 
worked with the English or German versions.
It is quite surprising that there have not been many more cases of 
this sort up till now.76 This may be explained in two ways. First, these 
cases are still forthcoming. Second, to simply confi rm the assumption 
made at the outset, the formal sources of law no longer correspond with 
the material ones, and no one seems to have noticed the absence of print-
ed versions of the Offi cial Journal. 
How should the Court of Justice approach cases of this type? As 
mentioned above, two questions will have to addressed: the question of 
the printed version of the Offi cial Journal and its availability, and the 
question of language. There are two extreme approaches. The Court 
could stick to the formal requirements and the formal “rules of recogni-
tion”, holding that all decision adopted on the basis of legislation not duly 
74 The forerunner to a re-assessment of the offi cial publication of law in Central Europe is 
Austria, which, as of 2004, abolished the printed version of its Offi cial Gazette (Bundesges-
etzblatt). The printed Gazette has been replaced by electronically signed versions in Adobe 
Acrobat’s PDF format, all published at a central address (http://www.ris.bka.gv.at). For 
more, see Kundmachungsreformgesetz 2004, BGBl. I Nr. 100/2003, 1471.
75 With the exception of Malta, where the English version of the Offi cial Journal is (tempo-
rally) accepted, and Cyprus, where the same task is performed by the Greek edition. As for 
the remaining eight new Member States, each of them brought their own language into the 
Community. 
76 With the notable exception of Poland - cf. the order of the Wojewódzki Sąd Administra-
cyjny in Bydgozsczy of 20th July 2005, case no. I SA/Bd 275/05, with a case note: A Wróbel, 
‘Glosa do wyroku Wojewódzkiego Sądu Administracyjnego w Bydgoszczy z 20.07.2005 r. 
(SA/Bd 275/05), wyrok niepublikowany’ (2006) Europejski Przeglad Sadowy styczen 48 
- 53. 
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published in the language of the Member State and in the printed version 
of the Offi cial Journal are void.77 Alternatively, the Court could go the 
route it suggested in the Oryzomyli Kavallas case, i.e. examining, in each 
individual case, the actual availability of Community legislation to the 
individual in question. The question posed in such an inquiry would be 
whether or not the legislation was absolutely inaccessible, or whether, if 
the individual had made reasonable effort, he or she could have obtained 
it. 
Both these approaches are highly problematic. If the fi rst route were 
to be taken, absolute legal chaos would ensue. As mentioned previously, 
even now all of the volumes of the Special Edition of the Offi cial Journal 
have still not been issued. These volumes have been published in a quite 
haphazard manner over the last two years. If legislation could be en-
forced only after its offi cial printed publication in the Offi cial Journal and 
in the language of the respective Member State, hundreds or thousands 
of administrative decisions, contracts and other legal acts adopted on the 
basis of unoffi cial translations or other language versions could be void. 
The other route is likewise problematic: modern legal systems are 
based on the notions of equality, territoriality of law, and the legal princi-
ple of ignorantia legis neminem excusat. Similar formal approaches have 
their fl aws; they are, however, reliable in that they enable one to ascer-
tain, at any given moment, what the law is. If enforcement of legal rules 
were to be made subject to the addressee’s capacity to read or under-
stand them, the system would revert to the medieval conception of the 
personality of the law and particular legal regimes, an outcome that is 
scarcely conceivable. 
It is obvious that the Court of Justice cannot reasonably adopt either 
of these extreme positions. It will have to carefully steer between Scylla 
and Charybdis in an effort to fi nd a sensible middle way. Whatever solu-
tion it adopts, it should bear in mind that its decision might possibly be 
challenged before one of the Central European constitutional courts. If 
the Court of Justice were to adopt an overly “pragmatic” approach, this 
might provoke negative reactions. 
Here again, as with the temporal application of EC law, time is on 
the Community’s side. First, all Community legislation will eventually, 
slowly but steadily, be published in the new Community languages. Sec-
77 The question is, of course, much more complex. It is conceivable that different answers 
might be found with regard to different types of Community legislation (regulations, direc-
tives, decisions) and different types of legal relations (vertical state against the individual, 
vertical individual against the state, horizontal). These issues are, unfortunately, far be-
yond the scope of this article. For a good overview, see R Procházka, ‘K publicite prameňov. 
komunitárneho práva’ [On Publication of the Sources of Community Law] (2004) JustiËná 
revue, sv. 56, Ë. 8-9, 856 et seq. 
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ond, only decisions or contracts adopted or concluded in the period be-
tween the moment of accession and due publication of the relevant piece 
of Community legislation may be challenged. Locus standi to challenge 
these acts before courts is limited; moreover, these claims will soon be-
come time-barred.
II.3. Iura novit curia (Does it really?)
“The court knows the law” - this old Roman maxim has become one 
of the building blocks of modern continental legal codifi cations. It means 
that a judge is obliged to apply valid laws ex offi cio, i.e. of his or her own 
motion. The correlative privilege of the parties to the dispute is not to 
have to argue points of law. This system represents the old idealistic con-
tinental model of the mechanical judge: the parties argue the facts, the 
judge adds the law, and the result is a perfect, syllogistic judgment. 
 This maxim still dominates the Czech legal system and legal theory. 
Sections 120 and 121 of the Czech Code of Civil Procedure78 defi ne the 
burden of proof in civil proceedings. The parties are generally obliged to 
prove their statements, with the exception of all “legal regulations pub-
lished in the [Offi cial] Collection of Laws”. The Czech Code of Adminis-
trative Justice, which is a more modern codifi cation, departs somewhat 
from this maxim by imposing on the parties the burden of submitting to 
the court not only the facts of the case, but also points of law.79 
These provisions deeply affect the standard of legal services and 
quality of applications submitted by advocates to the courts. A typical 
Czech application is a summary of the facts, several pages long, with 
only a timid allusion (if any at all) to the applicable law. Should any refer-
ence be made to points of law, it will be limited to statutes. No case law 
or doctrinal writings tend to be mentioned. This practice stands in sharp 
contrast to the detailed, elaborate analyses common in the Anglo-Ameri-
can legal tradition, where applications are usually dozens or even hun-
dreds of pages long. The Czech and Central European legal systems are, 
generally, still trapped in the idealistic vision of an all-knowing judge - a 
judge-machine to which one supplies the facts, then inserts a coin and 
waits for a neatly-packaged result at the other end.
This ideology is, however, crumbling on all sides, national as well as 
European. From the national point of view, it has been gradually eroded 
over the last decade or so. The legislative frenzy of the past ten years, 
caused by the approximation of laws and the complete renewal of the 
legal order, leading to what one justice of the Czech Constitutional Court 
78 Act no. 99/1963 Coll., as amended. 
79 Para 71, sec 1, item d) of the Code of Administrative Justice, Act no. 150/2002 Coll, as 
amended. 
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called its “decomposition”,80 cannot leave even the greatest judicial opti-
mist with the conviction that judges still know the law. Such a conviction 
might, arguably, still be tenable in the case of individual codifi cations, 
such as the Criminal Code, which provide the basis for an entire area 
of law.81 Yet it is no longer tenable in those areas of law which have no 
codes, and where judges are obliged to apply dozens or hundreds of acts 
and regulations. This is especially true of administrative justice.
Where does this leave the application of EU law in the new Member 
States? The Court of Justice’s case law is not of much help in this re-
spect. When assessing the obligation of national judges to apply EU law 
ex offi cio, the Court of Justice actually cross-referred the issue and sent 
it back to the national level: national courts are not obliged to raise issues 
concerning a breach of Community law of their own motion, provided 
that national regulations do not require them to do so with respect to a 
national law.82 If the question were to be returned to the national level, 
and the principle of equality applied, the conclusion would be that Czech 
judges are obliged to raise points of EC law on their own motion, and to 
actively seek and apply relevant EC law.
So much for legal theory. Of the dozens of cases decided or pending 
before national courts in the Visegrad states, as discussed in this pa-
per, there was only one single case where points of Community law were 
raised by a national judge of his own motion.83 In the rest of the cases, EC 
law points were discussed (sometimes very reluctantly) only after having 
been expressly raised by the parties’ legal representatives. 
It appears that the maxim iura novit curia has become almost un-
tenable with respect not only to Community law, but to national law as 
well. What might have been a workable procedural solution in the era of 
80 In this context, Justice Holländer was referring to the Czech Code of Civil Procedure, 
which, within one year, had undergone 18 direct and indirect amendments. P Holländer, 
Ústavněprávní argumentace [Constitutional Legal Reasoning] (Linde Publishing, Prague 
2003) 11.
81 However, even in “codifi ed” areas of law, such as criminal justice or criminal procedure, 
references are often made “outside” the provisions of the code itself. 
82 Cf. joined cases C-430 and 431/93 Jeroen Van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas Corne-
lis van Veen v. Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [1995] ECR I-4705 paras 13 
- 15; case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgian State [1995] ECR 
I-4599 paras 12 and 14; or case C-72/95 Aannemersbedrijf P.K. Kraaijeveld BV e.a. v Gede-
puteerde Staten van Zuid-Holland [1996] ECR I-5403 paras 58 and 60. For more, see e.g. 
G Canivet and J-G Huglo, ‘L´obligation pour le juge judiciaire national d´appliquer d´offi ce 
le droit communautaire au regard des arrêts Joroen, Van Schijndel et Peterbroeck’ (1996) 
Europe-Revue Mensuelle, Editions du Juris-Classeur, 6e Année, no. 4, 1-4 and S Prechal, 
‘Community Law in National Courts: The Lessons from Van Schijndel’ (1998) 35 CML Rev. 
681.
83 Case C-290/05 Nádasdi (n 4), where the referring court even relied on joined cases C-
240/98 and C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero and Emilio 
Viñas Feliú [2000] ECR I-1491.
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centuries-old legal codes and legislative and judicial stability is no longer 
possible, given today’s tens of thousands of pages of Community and na-
tional legislation and case law. We might confi dently predict that, at least 
in the initial stage of application of Community law in the new Member 
States, EC law arguments will be raised solely or primarily by the par-
ties’ legal representatives. This is no surprise in the old Member States, 
for most EC law angles in domestic disputes have been discovered and 
raised by the parties. In the new Member States, however, this will be a 
novelty as far as the position of the parties and the conduct of proceed-
ings is concerned, since iura novit curia has bred inertia among legal rep-
resentatives. It remains to be seen how far (and how fast) this novelty will 
spill over into purely domestic cases, where quality legal representation 
will no longer be a matter of simply reiterating the facts and leaving the 
court to determine the law. 
The gradual abandonment of this maxim also refl ects a deeper change 
in Central and Eastern European legal and judicial ideology.84 The om-
niscient, omnipotent court that knows the entire law is being replaced by 
an arbiter who needs the parties to tell it what the law is (or might be). 
The authoritarian approach to law is being replaced by a more discursive 
model. The responsibility for resolving a dispute no longer rests solely 
with the inquisitorial judge, but has partially shifted onto the parties and 
their representatives. 
III. Some generalisations 
To reply to the question raised by the title of this paper, how can 
the two years of EC law application in the Visegrad states be assessed? 
None of the catastrophic predictions have come true. The sky did not fall 
down following accession day, there were no funerals for defunct national 
sovereignty,85 and national courts were not swamped by a fl ood of “Euro-
cases”. On the other hand, it cannot be said that EC law is absolutely 
non-existent in the new Member States. The germs of EC law arguments 
have begun to sprout here and there, some of them assuming rather in-
teresting forms and blossoms.
84 Cf. Z Kühn, Aplikace práva soudcem v. éře středoevropského komunismu a transformace. 
Analýza příËin postkomunistické právní krize [Judicial Application of Law in Central Europe 
in the Communist and Transformation Eras. An Analysis of the Post-Communist Legal 
Crisis] (CH Beck, Prague 2005).
85 With the exception of those held by more conservative (virtually right-wing) forces in the 
new Member States, including, in the Czech Republic, the head of state. Cf. J Přibáň, ‘Eu-
ropean Hopes and National Fears: The Czech Constitutional System, Europe’s Legacy, Na-
tionalist “Politics of Identity” and New Tensions’ in: W Sadurski, J Ziller and K Zurek (eds), 
Après Enlargement: Legal and Political Responses in Central and Eastern Europe. (Robert 
Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Firenze 2006) 19 
- 40. 
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It is extremely diffi cult to assess in what number of cases EC law 
points have been raised so far. It might be noted that dozens of cases 
involving certain points of EC law are currently pending in the Czech Re-
public alone, with more being added every day. The start has been rather 
slow, a fact that may be easily explained by the speed of the judicial 
process. In civil and criminal cases, the average duration of judicial pro-
ceedings at each instance is about one year. By the end of 2005, the fi rst 
cases involving interesting points of EC law had begun crystallizing in the 
courts of appeal. This process is even slower in administrative courts; not 
because they are slower than general courts, but because cases normally 
have to pass through two instances of administrative authority before 
they can be reviewed in administrative justice. Moreover, applicants (and 
the legal community generally) are only slowly becoming aware of the 
possibilities that EC law offers them. We may suppose that a consider-
able amount of cases with an EC law angle go through the judicial system 
without that angle even being noticed. 
III.1. New Member States’ judges - not such a disaster? 
When writing about the prospects for applying EC law in Central 
Europe some two years ago, Zdeněk Kühn was rather sceptical.86 In his 
point of view, Central European judges are trapped in the realms of me-
chanical jurisprudence and textual positivism. They are unable to apply 
abstract legal principles, they have a negative attitude towards teleologi-
cal (purposive) argumentation, and they are incapable of using compara-
tive legal arguments. The only type of reasoning they use and under-
stand is that of legal force. More subtle forms of persuasive authority are 
disregarded. These observations lead Kühn to conclude that this might 
make for a serious problem once the new European judges start applying 
European law. 
Kühn’s analysis is excellent. In its retrospective part, it depicts and 
highlights the problems of judicial ideology in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope.87 At the same time, however, his analysis is unduly pessimistic as 
far as the prospects for applying EC law are concerned, since it is based 
on several incorrect assumptions. It may be argued that the early experi-
86 Cf. Z Kühn, ‘The Application of European Law in the New Member States: Several (Early) 
Predictions’ (2005) 6 German Law Journal no. 3, 565 et seq; Z Kühn, ‘New European Judg-
es: Are They Thinking on the Same Wavelength?’ (2004) Special Supplement, Common Law 
Review Prague 9 et seq and Z Kühn, ‘Worlds Apart: Western and Central European Judicial 
Culture at the Onset of the European Enlargement’ (2004) 52 Am.J.Comp.L. 531. Similar 
remarks have been made, with respect to Croatia, by T ∆apeta, ‘Courts, Legal Culture and 
EU Enlargement’ (2005) Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy 1, 23 - 53.
87 This retrospective analysis forms part of a larger work recently published as Z Kühn, 
Aplikace práva soudcem v éře středoevropského komunismu a transformace. Analýza příËin 
postkomunistické právní krize, (n 84).
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ence of Community law in the new Member States is not so desperate and 
gloomy as he predicts. 
The primary reservation regarding Kühn’s analysis is the problem 
of a suitable comparator. The author seems to have been carried away 
with his ideal “new European judge”, that “Hercules of Community law”, 
thereby disregarding the actual reality in new as well as old Member 
States. Kühn’s assumptions and vision of what new European judges 
should be doing are based (exclusively) on the requirements imposed by 
the Court of Justice’s case law, which are often quite remote from reality. 
It maybe argued, however, that the correct comparator for evaluating the 
performance of courts in the new Member States in similar types of cases 
are not the ideal requirements of the Court of Justice, but the national 
courts of the old Member States and their day-to-day practice in applying 
EC law. 
There is often a considerable gap between the “Luxembourg” version 
of Community law and Finnish, Greek, English or Hungarian practical 
application thereof. Taking the example of state liability cases, students 
of Community law are taught the Francovich case88 or the Factortame 
saga.89 They have recently been told that Member States may also be 
held responsible for judgments rendered in breach of Community law,90 
or that liability for breaches of EC competition law can also apply in hori-
zontal types of situations.91
What the students are not told, however, is that Mr Francovich never 
received any damages;92 that the English courts were unable, even ten 
years after the initial judgment by the Court of Justice, to substantiate 
the damages caused to the Spanish fi shermen;93 that similar problems 
with regard to horizontal breaches of Community law are likely to arise in 
the Crehan case;94 and that, fi nally, if Mr Köbler eventually receives some 
88 Joined cases C-6/1990 and C-9/1990 Andrea Francovich and Daniela Bonifaci and oth-
ers v Italian Republic [1991] ECR I-5357.
89 Case C-213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte Factortame Ltd and 
others [1990] ECR I-2433; joined cases C-46/93 and C-48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v. 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland and The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte: Fac-
tortame Ltd and others (III) [1996] ECR I-1029. 
90 Case C-224/01 Gerhard Köbler v Republik Österreich [2003] ECR I-10239.
91 Case C-453/99 Courage Ltd v Bernard Crehan and Bernard Crehan v Courage Ltd and 
Others [2001] ECR I-6297.
92 Because he belonged to a group of employees expressly excluded from the scope of the 
Directive for protection of employees in the event of an employer’s insolvency - cf. case C-
479/93 Andrea Francovich v Italian Republic [1995] ECR I-3843. 
93 Cf. the latest decision in the Factortame saga in R. v Secretary of State for Transport Ex p. 
Factortame Ltd (no.6) [2001] 1 W.L.R. 942 [2001] 1 C.M.L.R. 47 [2001].
94 Cf. the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Crehan v Inntrepreneur Pub Company 
CPC [2004] E.C.C. 28, currently pending on appeal before the House of Lords. 
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damages (a scenario which seems rather doubtful), this will happen no 
earlier than some 15 years after his litigation began.95 Similar question 
marks hover over virtually every area of the Court of Justice’s case law; 
once a case is sent back to the national level, no one seems to bother 
about whether or how the Court of Justice’s decision is applied in prac-
tice.96 However, the crucial stage in shaping EC law is precisely at the 
level of national courts; without proper construction and enforcement at 
the national level, EC law is non-existent, or, at best, reduced to judicial 
monologues in Luxembourg. 
It is precisely this gap between the “Luxembourg” and individual na-
tional versions of Community law that results in the aforementioned lack 
of a suitable comparator. Measuring the “performance” of new Commu-
nity judges against the Court of Justice’s reality-distant requirements97 
inevitably leads to fallacious conclusions regarding the quality of their 
reasoning and argumentation. The suitable comparator for judging the 
quality of “Euro-reasoning” in the new Member States’ courts is thus 
not the Court of Justice’s requirements, but rather the practice of other 
Member States’ courts shortly after their accession. Viewed against this 
background, it may be argued that the new Community judges are not 
doing much worse than their counterparts in other Member States.
It is true that this statement is, to a great extent, a mere denial of the 
opposing one, and not a genuine rebuttal of Kühn’s analysis of judicial 
incompetence in Central Europe. There is only limited empirical evidence 
as to what is genuinely happening before Central European courts. The 
qualitative analysis given in this article98 of more than 30 judicial pro-
ceedings or decisions applying EU law in one form or another may justify 
95 Cf. case C-224/01 Köbler (n 90) ; the original litigation in Austrian courts started in 1986, 
when Mr Köbler made his fi rst request for a length-of-service increment to his pension. 
96 With some rare exceptions, such as MA Jarvis, The Application of EC Law by National 
Courts: The Free Movement of Goods (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998). 
97 A fi ne example is the honest remark made by former Advocate General Jacobs in case 
C-338/95 Wiener S.I. GmbH v Hauptzollamt Emmerich [1997] ECR I-6518. The case con-
cerned, inter alia, a re-appraisal of the CILFIT criteria (Case 283/81 CILFIT, n 18) and the 
conditions under which a court of last instance may be relieved of its duty to submit a 
request for preliminary reference to the Court of Justice. One of these exceptions is the so-
called acte clair, i.e. a situation where correct interpretation of Community law is so obvious 
as to leave no room for doubt. However, before a national court concludes that an interpre-
tation is acte clair, it must take into account other language versions of the text. Concerning 
this requirement, the AG noted (in para 65 of his opinion) that this amounts to demanding 
of the national court something which even the Court of Justice does not do. 
98 This analysis is indeed rather qualitative, i.e. going into depth with individual cases, and 
not quantitative, i.e. considering a greater amount of cases. However, as already mentioned, 
the use of Community law in all Member States, including the old ones, is just the “icing 
on the cake”: the vast majority of cases on the overall docket of national courts are decided 
without any EC law argument. 
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the conclusion that the application of EC law in Central Europe is not as 
disastrous as predicted. 
In abstract terms, the suitable comparator problem is clearly visible 
in one argument put forward by Tamara ∆apeta. In an otherwise insight-
ful analysis of the judicial mentality in Central and Eastern Europe,99 she 
argues that one of the greatest problems for formalistic (Eastern) Europe-
an judges lies in the application of the principles of EC law. She expressly 
mentions the principle of effectiveness, or effective judicial protection, as 
one of the most intriguing concepts for the new Community judges. She 
is, however, fair enough to admit that disregard for the principle of effec-
tiveness “is quite likely to happen in courts of the existing Member States 
on a daily basis”.100 
It may be argued that the correct conclusion to be drawn from this 
statement is not, however, that the new Member States’ courts must 
learn to apply this principle, but rather that there is something wrong 
with it, since it does not seem to be functioning properly even in the 
most pro-European and progressive national courts of the old Member 
States. The explanation may lie in the nature of the principle itself: it is 
an open-ended, everywhere-leading type of argument, by its nature con-
cerned with the legislative choice of a regulatory technique, and not the 
proper construction of legal rules. That is why national courts virtually 
never apply this principle of their own motion. When national courts do 
decide to use it, this is typically a lower court trying to circumvent higher 
courts, or a higher court wishing to circumvent the legislature. They then 
submit the question to the Court of Justice on a preliminary reference for 
quasi-legislative approval, with a view to acquiring external authority for 
a solution which would be deemed unacceptable under national law.
Similar problems arise regarding the level of Kühn’s analysis. His 
argument is that, in order to apply EC law correctly, all national judges 
in the new Member States should embrace a teleological and effet utile 
kind of reasoning, combined with comparative legal arguments. There 
is, of course, some truth in this statement: there is a distinct style of 
EC judicial reasoning. However, we may argue that to require a shift of 
judicial style at all levels of the judicial hierarchy is unrealistic, and even 
dangerous.
The underlying hypothesis is that there is a considerable difference 
between the style of judicial reasoning used in supreme or constitutional 
courts and that which is common in fi rst instance or lower courts. The 
theory is that the higher we go in the judicial hierarchy, the more elab-
orate the reasoning ought to be. The judicial style changes (or should 
99 ∆apeta (n 86).
100 Ibid 45. 
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change) as well, from more positivistic, text-oriented legal interpretation 
at the fi rst instance, to more systematic and contextual reasoning at the 
supreme level. It is suggested that this difference in judicial style is fully 
justifi ed by the differing requirements placed on courts at different lev-
els: a fi rst instance judge is called upon to gather facts and decide, in an 
understandable way, regarding an individual case only. If, on the other 
hand, the complexity or novelty of a case requires an assessment at the 
highest instance, the supreme justice should view the case in a broader 
perspective, seeing beyond the individual case and turning to the inter-
pretation of principles, the use of comparative law, contextual and per-
haps teleological interpretation of the law, and so on. 
In short, the expectations made of the ideal “Hercules” of EC law are 
often ones which only higher or supreme courts - and not lower courts 
- are reasonably able to satisfy. The standard for lower courts usually 
remains a solid, reasonable textual positivism. This is, in a sense, the 
standard or level of service an average “judicial consumer” can expect 
from lower courts. If a person goes to a local court to enforce a contract, 
an elaborate teleological and comparative analysis of the principles of Eu-
ropean contract law would seem to be of little use. To require the trans-
formation of every national judges into a Hercules of EC law, a highfl ier 
of teleological interpretation, would be just as unfortunate as if all judges 
were dull formalists. 
III.2. Sweet and sour
Prediction is very diffi cult, especially if it is about the future. Mind-
ful of this warning allegedly uttered by Niels Bohr, what generalisations 
and predictions can we make about the application of EC law in the new 
Member States? As in every story, there are some positive as well as 
negative aspects; the sweet is mixed with the sour.
Starting with the positive aspects, there are some characteristics 
of post-communist law and the judiciary which might enable faster, 
smoother adaptation to, and application of, Community law than in some 
older Member States. First, as already mentioned above, post-communist 
legal systems suffer from great legislative instability. Yet this vice may 
have a positive side effect, one which we may term the “advantage of the 
momentum of change”. The continual and innumerable amendments to 
virtually every piece of legislation over the last 15 years have created ex-
tremely adaptable judges (in a positive as well as a negative sense), who 
will be able to cope with EC law much more quickly than their colleagues 
in established old Member States, who are used to the invariability of le-
gal codes dozens or hundreds of years old. On the other hand, it is proper 
to admit that this ability to absorb new legal provisions does not say 
anything about the much-needed deeper reform of judicial methodology 
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and the argumentation process. It may be claimed, however, that correct 
application of Community law’s substantive provisions is so tightly inter-
twined with the methodology of applying it that any “incorrect” methodol-
ogy will soon be detected in the substance of the decision. 
Second, there are also some personnel aspects of the Czech judici-
ary which might speed up the judicial application of EC law. Visegrad 
judiciaries are, like their continental counterparts, conceived of as career 
judiciaries. Older generations of career judges have generally not studied 
EC law (or any sort of “capitalist” law, for that matter), and tend to be 
limited as far as foreign languages are concerned. The new generation of 
judges, appointed during the last ten years, at a time when EC law and 
languages were being taught in law schools,101 have a better starting po-
sition in fi nding EC law arguments. To some extent, these capacities are 
becoming a decisive factor whereby the new generation of judges may be 
distinguished from the older one. Younger judges, who presently serve on 
courts of the fi rst instance, may be more eager to use EC law arguments 
in order to “escape” the supervision of their older colleagues, who control 
the appellate and supreme levels of the judiciary. Relying on Commu-
nity law gives junior judges a very powerful source of external authority, 
which could be used against their more senior colleagues. 
The limits of greater application of EC law in the new Member States 
is not a question of rejection, revolt, or some sort of intentional positivist 
ignorance of the teleological depth of Community law. The true limits are 
language barriers and the unavailability of sources. The question of the 
enforceability of non-translated and unpublished sources of Community 
law has been briefl y discussed above. This problem is, unfortunately, but 
a small part of the greater problem of a general inaccessibility of Com-
munity law in the languages of new Member States. If we consider the 
fact that not all enforceable legislation has been translated and duly pub-
lished yet, then what about other sources of Community law (in a broader 
sense)? The situation in these areas seems even more desperate: almost 
two years after accession, not one single decision by the Court of Justice 
has been published in Czech,102 there are no detailed doctrinal writings 
101 At least nominally, leaving aside the question of quality and the real outcome.
102 Following accession the Court of Justice’s case law was to have been published in a 
Czech version of the European Court Reports. Not a single volume has yet been published. 
The only available source in Czech remains the Court of Justice’s website, where only pro-
visional translations of cases handled by Community courts after 1 May 2004 are posted. 
Of these, however, less than half are available in Czech, to say nothing of Advocate General 
Opinions, where the situation is even more problematic. The most important pre-accession 
cases, a list of which was compiled by the Court of Justice (i.e. the jurisprudence historique, 
containing 869 key decisions by the Court), are to be published in the Czech Special Edition 
of the European Court Reports. Translation of these cases only started a few months ago (in 
late 2005), and none have been published yet. 
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or textbooks about the majority of EC laws,103 and a quick surf on the 
Internet shows that the vast majority of secondary sources and various 
types of soft law are accessible only in English or French.104 
These are the real obstacles to greater application of EC law in the 
new Member States. This situation also creates a dangerous bitterness 
among the smaller new Member States, including various complaints 
about “second-class” membership. It is obvious that some of the fi c-
tions concerning linguistic equality within the European Union and the 
motto “united in diversity”105 have become indefensible.106 The linguistic 
requirements which a proper application of Community law imposes on 
an English or French judge are quite different than those faced by a Hun-
garian or Portuguese one. The example of a Portuguese judge has been 
chosen deliberately, for the problem of languages is not unique to this 
last enlargement. The 2004 enlargement only more sharply and broadly 
revealed the problems already lurking underneath the Europe of 15. A 
Europe of 25 (and soon 27) will only become more disintegrated and di-
vergent, with the general linguistic Babel contributing greatly thereto. 
Despite these practical problems, I would still propose a rather opti-
mistic outlook on the application of Community law in the new Member 
States. The majority of these problems will be solved with time; some will 
need more effort on both sides, the national as well as the European. 
Change will take time, as in any other new Member State. This gradual 
change will be visible in the style of judicial dialogue as well. The initial 
stage of EC law application will surely be a merely passive reception of 
a new and unknown legal order.107 It is, however, only a matter of time 
103 Including areas of utmost importance in EC substantive law, such as the four freedoms, 
customs law, social security, and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. There 
are, of course, general textbooks on EC or EU law, yet their generality sets a clear limit on 
their use by legal practitioners, who are mostly interested in more detailed knowledge or 
particular information from a specifi c area of law. 
104 Including, for that matter, the websites of the key European institutions and the main 
portal http://www.europa.eu.int.
105 Provided, of course, that “diversity” is not a new codename for disintegration. In this 
respect, the new European motto might compete with the very best of George Orwell (“War 
is Peace”, “Freedom is Slavery”, “Ignorance is Power”, etc.). Cf. G Orwell, 1984. (Secker and 
Warburg, London 1949) 2 - 3. 
106 Oddly enough, it is the French who normally complain about a disregard for “other” 
languages within the European Union, despite the fact that French is the last language but 
one within the EU with any reason to complain - unless, of course, “other” means precisely 
“French”. Cf. e.g. A Fenet, ‘Diversité linguistique et construction européenne’ (2001) 37 (2) 
RTD eur. 235 - 269; A Lopes Sabino, ‘Les langues dans l´Union européenne - enjeux, pra-
tique et perspectives’ (1999) 35 (2) RTD eur. 159 - 169; and B Nabli, ‘Les implications de 
l´élargissement sur le multilinguisme institutionnel de l´Union européenne’ (2004) Cahier 
de droit europeen 40 nos. 1-2, 197 - 223. 
107 ∆apeta (n 86) 45.
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before the new European judges learn how to use EC law more creatively, 
and to question some of its principles.108 
The Community judicial structure should be based on dialogue and 
mutual intellectual enrichment. There is no doubt that the new Member 
States’ lawyers and judges will have to adjust some of their methodology 
to European standards. This does not mean, however, that enrichment 
and “learning” will fl ow in one direction only, i.e. from the Court of Jus-
tice and the “old” Europe to the new Member States. It is not only the 
vices and ragbags of an outdated post-communist legal conception which 
the new Member States have brought to the European Union. Some posi-
tive values and attitudes may be discovered as well, such as a greater 
deference to the legislature, or a more “conservative” judicial ideology. 
Perhaps the time is ripe for the Court of Justice to set its legal reason-
ing and judicial style on a more solid foundation than the all-embracing, 
everywhere-leading effet utile can offer. 
Central and Eastern European judges generally display a sound de-
gree of scepticism towards the teleological and effet utile style of reason-
ing used by the Court of Justice. This might be caused by their nega-
tive historical experience. Heretical though it may sound, there are some 
striking similarities between the communist/Marxist and Community 
approaches to legal reasoning, and the requirements of judicial activ-
ism placed on national judges. Marxist law required, at least in its early 
(Stalinist) phase, that judges disregard the remnants of the old bourgeois 
legal system in the interest of the victory of the working class and the 
communist revolution. Judges were supposed to apply the law in an anti-
formalistic, almost teleological way, always directing their aim towards 
the victory of the working class and the dialectic approach. EC law re-
quires national judges to set aside all national law which is incompatible 
with the full effectiveness of Community law, i.e. with such open-ended 
principles and aims as the full effectiveness of EC law enforcement, or 
the unity of EC law across the entire Union. In a way, both approaches 
are very similar: open-ended clauses take precedence over a textual in-
terpretation of the written law. Often the desired result comes fi rst, with 
a backward style of reasoning being used to arrive at it. The only visible 
difference is that the universal “all-use” argument has changed - from the 
victory of the working class to the full effectiveness of EC law. 
108 The examples, discussed above, of the fi rst Polish reference for preliminary ruling (case 
C-313/05 Brzeziński n 5) and one of those from Hungary (case C-290/05 Nádasdi n 12) 
show that the new Community judges have already understood how to use Community law 
to get rid of obnoxious national legislation (e.g. a registration tax on imported second-hand 
cars), which, at least at the national level, does not correspond with the image of a docile, 
passive legal formalism. 
298 Michal Bobek: A New or a Non-Existent Legal Order? Some (Early) Experience in the Application...
This comparison is, of course, exaggerated. Yet there is a grain of 
truth in it. The scepticism towards a teleological style of reasoning shown 
by post-communist judiciaries has its historical roots. During the last 
decades of communist rule in Central Europe, legal formalism and strict 
textual interpretation of the law become a natural line of defence against 
the anti-formalistic teleological style of judicial reasoning offi cially re-
quired by Party policy.109 After the Velvet Revolution, a slow, timid eman-
cipation of the judiciary began. The newly acquired space for interpretive 
freedom has, naturally, often been misunderstood or even misused.110 It 
is, nonetheless, jealously guarded against new intruders who may try to 
conquer it using the same methods, albeit with a different content. 
On the whole, there is no doubt that, driven by the selfi sh commer-
cial interests of the parties and their lawyers, Community law will soon 
begin to appear more often in the new Member States’ courtrooms. This 
will soon become a tidal wave. Yet not in the pessimistic, catastrophic 
sense Lord Denning MR might have predicted,111 but rather in a more 
positive one, sweeping away the remaining post-communist leftovers 
from the Augean stable. 
109 Cf. Kühn (n 84) 86.
110 Most notably, as far as the status of previous judicial decisions is concerned, cf. F Em-
mert, ‘The Independence of Judges - A Concept Often Misunderstood in Central and East-
ern Europe’ (2002) European Journal of Law Reform, vol. 3, 405.
111 “[…] But when we come to matters with a European element, the Treaty is like an in-
coming tide. It fl ows into the estuaries and up the rivers. It cannot be held back […].” Lord 
Denning MR in H. P. Bulmer Ltd. and Another v. J. Bollinger S.A. and Others [1974] Ch. 401, 
418.
